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•
“The Race to the Bottom”
Competition in the Law of Property

John V. Orth

“T

he race to the bottom” is a
phrase made famous in the history of the law of business associations.1 Starting in the 1890s, New Jersey
and Delaware competed for the privilege of
chartering corporations (and reaping the
associated economic benefits). The states
engaged in a sort of Dutch auction, progressively offering better and better, that is, lower and lower, terms in their standard-form
corporate charters. Eventually, New Jersey
dropped out of the running, and Delaware
won the race – which, of course, is why today one of the nation’s smallest states hosts

the “headquarters” of so many large corporations and why the Delaware Chancery
Court is one of the world’s busiest business
courts.
Competition between American states
is not surprising. The single economic and
social union that is the United States, legally bound up by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Federal Constitution,2 makes
it almost inevitable. The state of Nevada is
an obvious example. Permissive divorce laws
made it an early destination for unhappy
couples,3 just as relaxed marriage requirements still make it popular with hopeful

John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. This article is the sixth in his series of reappraisals in the law of property.
1 See, e.g., 2 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States 58 (2002). The
classic statement of the race-to-the-bottom thesis is William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974). Whether the race was truly to the “bottom” is debated; whether there was even a race at all is denied. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan s Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679 (2002). The race-to-the-bottom metaphor is
nowadays also used to describe and decry the effects of globalization. See, e.g., Robert J.S. Ross s Anita
Chan, From North-South to South-South: The True Face of Global Competition, 81:5 Foreign Affairs 8
(Sept./Oct. 2002) (“The absence of a mechanism establishing international labor standards is propelling the economies of the South in a race to the bottom in wages and labor conditions.”).
2 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State … .”).
3 In the days of the British Empire, the central authorities were particularly concerned that divergent
divorce laws in various parts of the Empire would lead to people “running from place to place in search
of divorces.” Bruce Kercher, An Unruly Child: A History of Law in Australia 139 (1995).
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young people.4 Legalized gambling attracts at least willing to give it a chance, “social exmillions of visitors annually, even as other periment” is a happier description than “race
states (and Indian reservations) have entered to the bottom.”
the field.5 Still the only state to allow betting
While these legal experiments are in
on collegiate athletics and to give most of its progress, they provide a social safety valve, an
counties the option to legalize prostitution, outlet for those activities that are elsewhere
Nevada continues to exploit its law-making, illegal.7 Observation of the outcome may
or rather its law-repealing, advantages. It is eventually convince other states to follow
ironic that a state so closely associated in the their example. In the meantime, these “social
public mind with lawlessness and the Mob laboratories” produce “experimental law” not
is the supreme example of the law’s power to only for their own citizens, but also for those
influence behavior.
with the time and money necessary to travel
Whether this competition is good or bad to the appropriate legal marketplace. Of
depends on one’s point of view. The phrase course, in a democratic society the existence
“race to the bottom” obviously encodes a of “law for the elites” – or, to be more prenegative judgment, but a different label sug- cise, venues for elites to get the law they pregests a different conclusion. In a celebrated fer – increases the pressure on other states
dissent, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis to “democratize” the benefit (and not lose
Brandeis described as “one of the happy in- out on the profits). What ended the attraccidents of the federal system that a single tion of the “Reno divorce” was the adoption
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, of relaxed divorce laws in other states. Gamserve as a laboratory; and try novel social bling works for Nevada, providing the state
and economic experiments without risk to with sufficient revenue to maintain a low-tax
the rest of the country.”6 Although Brandeis regime, thereby attracting new residents and
had legal restrictions on economic competi- businesses, and increasing the pressure on
tion in mind, his formula applies equally well other states to offer gambling opportunito the removal of restraints, social as well as ties. Without Nevada’s legislative power, Las
economic. If one approves of the result, or is Vegas and much of the state would still be
4

The Clark County, Nevada, Marriage License Bureau is open seven days a week 8am to midnight and
24 hours on legal holidays. No blood test is required and there is no waiting period; the fee is about $35.
Frommer’s Las Vegas 2001 at 184–85 (2001). Nevadans seem to have lost their nerve when it came
to toleration of same-sex marriage. Not only did Massachusetts win that race by legalizing such unions,
see Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), but Nevadans even amended
their state constitution to prohibit their state from competing for the business. Nev. Const. art. I, § 21
(“Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect in this state.”).
See John V. Orth, Night Thoughts: Reflections on the Debate Concerning Same-Sex Marriage, 3 Nev. L. J.
560 (2003).
5 Today 198 federally recognized Indian tribes run 326 gambling facilities in 28 states, generating about
$10 billion annually, one-seventh of all legal gambling proceeds. Craig Lambert, Trafficking in Chance,
Harvard Magazine 33, 40 ( July-August 2002).
6 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The same advantage has been touted for the Australian Federation. The proposed constitution of the European Union
describes the process with the anodyne phrase “open method of coordination.” See Kalypso Nicolaidis,
“We, the Peoples of Europe…,” 83:6 Foreign Affairs 97, 105–06 (2004).
7 Legalized betting on collegiate sports, restricted to Nevada by a 1993 federal law, is sometimes justified
as a means of monitoring the illegal betting that undoubtedly occurs in other states and providing a
legal outlet for complaints about tampering with student athletes. See Chad Millman, The Odds:
One Season, Three Gamblers, and the Death of Their Las Vegas 186–91 (2001).
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uninhabited desert.
protect the settlor’s assets from the claims of
Elites do not necessarily need to travel creditors.11
to take advantage of favorable legal regimes.8
Competition creates a “market” for laws
Given the fact that money is easily transmit- not only between states in a federal union
ted within the United States, competition but also between courts of concurrent jurishas broken out among the states to secure diction operating in the same state. In Engthe trust business of the wealthy by offer- land before the Judicature Acts of 1873–75,12
ing better (that is, less restrictive) trust law.9 the three common-law courts of King’s
When Delaware recently repealed the Rule (Queen’s) Bench, Common Pleas, and ExAgainst Perpetuities as applied to trusts, it chequer exercised overlapping jurisdiction.
freely admitted in the preamble to its stat- Throughout the Middle Ages, a lively comute that the purpose was to keep the state’s petition among these courts, driven by the
banks and trust companies competitive in at- judges’ desire to augment their incomes with
tracting capital. Pointing the finger at “several fees from the litigants, had produced subinnovative jurisdictions that have abolished stantial improvements in justice.13 The acthe rule,” the statute recited that “[s]everal tion of ejectment, which began as a tenant’s
financial institutions have now organized remedy, was made available as a means to
or acquired trust companies, particularly in try title to land by the toleration of a conSouth Dakota, at least in part to take ad- venient legal fiction; because of procedural
vantage of their favorable trust law.”10 Deter- advantages, it relegated the “proper” remedy,
mined to beat these states at their own game the writ of right, to oblivion.14 The action of
and “maintain Delaware’s role as the most trover, which began as a finder’s remedy (as
favored jurisdiction for the establishment its French name implies), became the means
of trusts,” the state went on to authorize the to try title to chattels by a similar fiction and
creation of self-settled spendthift trusts that won out over the ancient action of detinue,
8

9
10

11

12
13
14

Travel is obviously necessary if actual physical presence is required, as for marriage or divorce. Gambling, too, requires a presence in the state since the Interstate Wire Act of 1960 prohibits the placing
of bets over means of interstate communication, such as the telephone and internet. In some cases,
personal presence may actually be a disadvantage. For trusts located in Delaware, no state income tax is
levied if the beneficiaries live in another state.
There has long been competition for trust business between American states, on the one hand, and
foreign nations, particularly small island nations, on the other. What foreign nations could not offer, of
course, was the stability and security of American law.
1996 Laws of Del., ch. 538 (amending Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 503), preamble quoted in Jesse
Dukeminier s Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 854 (6th ed. 2000). South
Dakota had earlier repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 43–5-4;
43–5-8. See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends – An
Essay, 35 Real Prop., Probate s Trust J. 601 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to
Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2097 (2003).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3570 ff. (2002).
�������� See John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes With Offshore Trusts, 23 Del. J. Corp. L. 423
(1998). Previously, spendthrift provisions were limited to trusts for the benefit of others than the settlor.
George T. Bogert, Trusts § 40, p. 155 (6th ed. 1987) (“a property owner may not create a spendthrift
trust in his own favor”).
36 s 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873); 38 s 39 Vict. c. 77 (1875).
For a brief survey, see John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 32–35 (2d ed.,
Roland Gray ed., 1927). For a facetious summary with a serious intent, see John V. Orth, A Reverie on
Medieval Judges, Milton Friedman, and the Supreme Court’s Workload, 69 A.B.A.J. 1454 (1983).
See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 199–206 (1768).
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also because of procedural advantages.15
v. Tompkins19 put an end to this competiIn addition, the English Chancery Court, tion, commonly known by the bad name of
usually known as “equity,” was famously avail- “forum shopping.” Luckily for industries enable to supplement the common law when- gaged in interstate commerce, other forces
ever the legal remedy was inadequate, leaving – national legal education, scholarly treatises,
a legacy that survived the eventual merger in and uniform acts – were by then available to
most jurisdictions of law and equity.16 The provide the homogenization once provided
trust for a married woman’s “sole and sepa- by the federal courts.
rate use” offered wealthy fathers a means to
Legal competition occurs not only becircumvent the male-dominated common tween states or courts; it even occurs belaw and protect a daughter’s property from tween legal doctrines within the same juher husband and his creditors. The celebrat- risdiction. Where there are two different
ed passage of Married Women’s Property means to the same end, lawyers and judges
Acts in England and America in the mid- will constantly be required to compare and
nineteenth century made the benefits avail- contrast them, and litigants will advance
able to all married women.17
one or the other as it suits their interests.
In the United States the federal system It is a staple of first-year property law that
gave litigants a choice of federal or state inter vivos gifts of personal property recourts in many private law actions, at least quire donative intent, delivery, and accepwhen the parties were not citizens of the tance.20 Of the three, delivery is the most
same state. For almost a century after Swift problematic, as the cases amply attest. Left
v. Tyson (1842),18 federal judges exploited to more advanced property courses is the
this “diversity jurisdiction” to offer litigants fact that by a mere oral declaration of trust
a national brand of commercial law. Only in a donor may transfer beneficial title (the
1938 did the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad only one that usually matters) without de15
16

20

See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 150–53 (1768).
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court.…,” i.e., not in separate courts of law and equity as in England at the time); N.C. Const. art. IV,
§ 13 (“There shall be in this State but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private
rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action…,” i.e., not separate
actions at law and suits in equity) (original in N.C. Const. of 1868 art. IV, § 1). See John V. Orth, The
North Carolina Constitution: A Reference Guide 112 (1993). In England the merger of law
and equity was complete by 1875, but a few common law jurisdictions retained separate equity courts
much longer. The Australian state of New South Wales maintained the separation until 1972. Patrick
Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law 157–58 (2d ed. 2001). The state of Delaware still does.
See A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England
During the Nineteenth Century 371–98 (2d ed. 1914). See also N.C. Const. art. X, § 4 (“The
real and personal property of any female in this State acquired before marriage, and all property, real
and personal, to which she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the
sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or
engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed and conveyed by her….”) (original in
N.C. Const. of 1868 art. X, § 6); John V. Orth, The North Carolina Constitution: A Reference Guide 154–55 (1993).
16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842).
304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift). See generally Tony A. Freyer, Harmony and Discourse:
The Swift and Erie Cases in American Federalism (1981).
Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 38, p. 84 (2d ed. 1955).
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livery.21 The roots of the two doctrines lie an intended gift fails for lack of delivery but
in the dual sources of Anglo-American ju- courts nonetheless “torture,” as he put it, “an
risprudence. Law, with its tradition of fixed imperfect gift into a declaration of trust.”25
rules and remedies, gave rise to the formal While nominally concerned with discernrequirements for gifts,22 while equity, with ing intention – to make a present gift or to
its emphasis on intention and consequent create a trust – the real concern seems to be
tolerance of informality, was the home of with drawing the proper legal lines.
the trust.
The effect again is to create law for the
Maintaining the distinction between gifts elites, this time not in the sense of those with
and trusts has been a recurring preoccupa- the resources to travel (or send their money)
tion of judges and property scholars. In the to the most attractive legal marketplace but
first part of the nineteenth century, a line of in the sense of those with the best lawyers.
English cases threatened to eliminate the The legally well advised may undoubtedly
legal requirement of delivery altogether by make gifts without delivery by making an extreating almost any manifestation of donative press and well attested declaration that they
intent as a declaration of trust.23 Sir George hold legal title as trustee for the beneficiaryJessel, himself an influential equity judge, fi- donee. A simple donor of a common law gift,
nally put an end to this development in 1874 on the other hand, must see to it that there
by ruling that “for a man to make himself a is an actual delivery of the item itself (or at
trustee there must be an expression of inten- least some part or symbol of it) or risk the
tion to become a trustee, whereas words of failure of the transfer.26 The ironic result of
present gift shew an intention to give over the continued distinction is that the courts
property to another, and not to retain it in will enforce an oral declaration that A gives
the donor’s own hands for any purpose, fidu- B the beneficial interest in a chattel while reciary or otherwise.”24 In America, Professor taining the legal interest, but will not enforce
Austin Scott, a founding scholar of the mod- an oral declaration that A gives B the entire
ern law of trusts, frowned on cases where interest.27
21

22
23
24
25

26

27

The beneficial title acquired by the donee in a declaration of trust is in one situation inferior to the
legal title acquired by the donee of a completed inter vivos gift: if the trustee disposes of the property
to a purchaser for value and without notice of the equitable interest, the purchaser’s title prevails over
the donee’s title. George T. Bogert, Trusts § 165, p. 597 (6th ed. 1987) (“bona fide purchaser rule”).
Of course, the beneficiary in such a situation is entitled to enforce a constructive trust on the property
acquired by the trustee in exchange for the trust corpus. Rest. 2d Trusts § 202 (“trust pursuit rule”).
The delivery requirement in the law of gifts has very ancient antecedents and has been related to the
comparable requirement in the early law of feoffments, livery of seisin. See Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D.
57, 65–66 (C.A. 1890).
Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. Jun. 140, 34 Eng. Rep.
������������
271 (Ch. 1811); Morgan v. Malleson, L.R. 10 Eq. 475 (1870).
Richards v. Delbridge, L.R. 18 Eq. 11, 15 (1874).
1 Austin W. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 31, p. 321 (4th ed., William F. Fratcher ed., 1987). Scott
did allow that in case the intended donee of a failed inter vivos gift reasonably relied on the prospective
benefit, a constructive trust could be impressed, but he insisted that in such case “equity is not converting an imperfect gift into a declaration of trust, but is merely imposing a duty on the donor in order to
prevent unjust enrichment.” Id. § 31.4, p. 350.
Actual delivery of the donated chattel may be excused if it is too bulky or if, for some good reason, it is
not at hand, but some symbol of it must be actually delivered. Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of
Personal Property § 41, p. 102 (2d ed. 1955). The legal fiction of “constructive delivery” was the common law’s way of mitigating the harshness of the delivery rule.
See C.B. Labatt, The Inconsistencies of the Laws of Gifts, 29 Am. L. Rev. 361, 368 (1895).
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The alternative of a declaration of trust
has not been altogether without effect on
the law of gifts. The delivery requirement is
subject to constant pressure not only from
the increased value now assigned to intention but also from the existence of a parallel gifting procedure that never required
delivery.28 Recent Restatements of the Law
reflect the current ambivalence. While the
Restatement (Second) of Property officially
takes no position on whether a gift may be
effective without delivery, it does take note of
the fact that “a beneficial interest in personal
property can be conferred on another person
by an oral declaration of trust even though
there is no delivery” and suggests that “the
law should recognize, to the extent it has not
already done so, that a completed gift of personal property may be accomplished without
a delivery by proof of the donor’s manifested
intention to make a gift.”29 The Restatement
(Third) of Trusts straddles the same divide.
To the black-letter rule that “[i]f a property
owner intends to make an outright gift inter vivos but fails to make the transfer that
is required in order to do so, the gift intention will not be given effect by treating it as
a declaration of trust,” the reporter appends
the subversive comment that “the preferred
interpretation in marginal cases of this type
is not that the property owner was merely
expressing an intention to make a gift in the
future but rather that the owner intended a

declaration of trust.”30
This tension is unlikely to be easily resolved. The judges, who created the delivery
requirement in the first place, are reluctant to
abandon it not only because of their professional attachment to traditional doctrine but
also because it gives them added flexibility in
the administration of justice. As one court
that had occasion to consider the alternatives
put it: “Obviously, it would be neither advisable nor wise to abrogate the requirement of
delivery in any and all cases of intended intervivos gifts, for to do so, even under the guise
of enforcing equitable rights, might open the
door to fraudulent claims.”31 The delivery requirement, in other words, provides another
line of defense against ambiguous or selfserving testimony about donative intent.
A similar competition, but one with far
greater consequences, has affected gratuitous transfers at death. Ordinarily effected
by the last will and testament, the intergenerational transfer of wealth may also be
arranged through an ever-lengthening list of
alternatives. The modern will, the product
of statutes beginning in the sixteenth century,32 generally requires a writing, signed by
the testator and attested by two witnesses.
Recognized centuries before the first Statute of Wills, the joint tenancy in land with
its associated right of survivorship long provided an alternative legal means for arranging succession at death.33 The development

28 See Sarajane Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic Anomaly, 67 Ky. L.J. 309
(1979); Chad A. McGowan, Special Delivery: Does the Postman Have to Ring at All? The Current State of
the Delivery Requirement for Valid Gifts, 31 Real Prop., Probate, s Trust J. 357 (1996).
29 Rest. 2d Prop. Donative Transfers § 31.1, comment k. This is true, but only in the sense of a gift of
the beneficial interest.
30 Rest. 3d Trusts § 16 (2), comment d.
31 Hebrew Univ. Assoc. v. Dye, 223 A.2d 397, 401 (Conn. Superior Ct. 1966) (upholding gift by finding
delivery of written instrument). Cf. Hebrew Univ. ������������������������������������������������������
Assoc. v. Dye, 169 A.2d 641 (Conn. Superior
�������������������
Ct. 1961)
(finding insufficient evidence of express declaration of trust).
32 See Kenelm Edward Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property 377–92 (5th ed. 1897) (tracing legislation from 1530 to 1837).
33 See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law, Plus ça Change, 5 Green Bag 2d 173–80 (2002). A joint tenancy
in land is not an exact alternative to a will, because a present interest vests in the cotenant at the creation

52

9 G r e e n B a g 2 d  47

“Th e R a c e t o t h e B o t t o m”
of modern banking and the invention of
the joint and survivor bank account generalized this to include personal property in
the form of deposits, so much so that these
accounts have been dubbed the “poor man’s
will.”34 Modern brokerage houses offer the
same option for investment accounts. The
insurance industry pioneered the pay-ondeath contract, and the federal government
adopted this attractive feature for United
States savings bonds. A few states allow a
death beneficiary to be named in a deed of
land.35
It is the trust, however, that has become
the ultimate “will substitute.”36 As befits its
equitable origin, the trust may be created
with few formalities and allows great flexibility. During life, a settlor may transfer assets
into a revocable trust, reserving a life estate
and specifying future interests; if unrevoked
at death, the trust then disposes of the property. Modern estate planners, astute not to
lose the ambulatory potential of testamentary dispositions, generally add a “pour-over
will,” which transfers to the trust any assets
remaining in the settlor’s sole name at death.
Trust law is typically elite law. The revocable34

35
36

37

38

trust-pour-over-will arrangement is for well
advised, usually wealthy clients. Without
competent advice, settlors of small trusts, often of the do-it-yourself variety, sometimes
forget to keep their trust documents current
and end up with improperly titled property
and poorly maintained records, resulting in
unnecessary expense and occasionally unintended dispositions.37
As with inter vivos gifts, the simultaneous
existence of a less formal means to the same
end has placed tremendous pressure on the
more formalized alternative. If simpler will
substitutes are available, how can statutory
will formalities that might defeat intention
be justified? In fact, wills law is now subject
to searching criticism and a movement is
underway in favor of disregarding “harmless
error” in execution, permitting “substantial
compliance” with the formalities, or simply
granting the judiciary a power to dispense
with the necessary forms.38
Labels encode conclusions. ������������
They do not
(or should not) dictate them. The “race to the
bottom” is competition to get to a destination we do not wish to reach, while “social
experiments” sound at once scientific and

of the estate.
See In re Estate of Michaels, 132 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1965). See also Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts:
The Poor Man’s Will, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 103 (1953). Unlike the joint tenancy in land, no interest passes
to a donee “co-depositor” at the creation of the account, only a power to draw on deposited funds, which
explains why the federal gift tax is not imposed until an amount is actually withdrawn by the non-depositing party.
See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59–3501; Ohio Rev. Stat. 5302.22.
The trust, in its guise as a “use,” was available before the first Statute of Wills to provide a functional
alternative in equity. See Kenelm Edward Digby, An Introduction to the History of the
Law of Real Property 330–33 (5th ed. 1897). It is an irony of history that the trust (use) was a will
substitute before there were wills, and that, after centuries of eclipse by the will proper, it has resumed
this role.
See, e.g., Austin, Trustee v. City of Alexandria, 574 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 2003) (holding ineffective a second
transfer by a settlor who had previously transferred the same property into a revocable trust); Secor
Investments v. Anderegg, 71 P.3d 538 (Or. 2003) (illustrating the distinct legal personalities of the settlor
as an individual and as the trustee of a self-settled inter vivos trust); First Nat’l Bank of Bar Harbor v.
Anthony, 557 A.2d 957 (Me. 1989) (holding ineffective an apparent attempt to revoke a revocable inter
vivos trust by a will).
See Uniform Probate Code § 2–503 (harmless error); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance
With the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1975). See also John V. Orth, Intention in the Law of Property:
The Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 Green Bag 2d 59 (2004).
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courageous. Competition is probably inevitable in a federal system, and may well be
desirable. Rather than worry about whether
we are in a race to somewhere-or-other, we
should concentrate our attention on the end
we want to attain, then on the means to get
there. “Law for elites” has an unwholesome
sound in a democracy; only a “savage race,”

39

54

as Tennyson so memorably put it, deserves
“unequal laws.”39 But equal laws do not necessarily serve everyone equally well. Seeking
the least common denominator, commentators and judges may well be distracted from
the real project of providing formal requirements appropriate to the transaction and its
likely participants.

Alfred Tennyson, Ulysses (1842) l. 4.
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